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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
within ivy, are sure to enter the judicial crucible and thus similarly to
have their impact on how judges judge. The oldest of limitations, money,
will unfortunately be of major importance: someone must pay for an
expert from the East to testify in the West, if only his airplane ticket or,
if by deposition, the lawyers' airplane tickets. Only great causes can
afford great experts.
VIII.
And lastly . . . maybe it should be firstly . .. judges have
personalities. They have prejudices and stomach aches and pride and
stalled cars and inspirations and hangovers and far visions and sore
feet. All judges try, and most succeed in reducing the impact of
"gastronomical jurisprudence", 4 but few reduce its effect to zero.
For after all judges are. . . thanks be to Heaven . . . human. They
are not computers controlled by always knowable inputs. Neither are
they scientists indifferently imposing inexorable rules. They are only
humans, judging only humans, hopefully themselves in turn to be
similarly judged.
Response-Werner F. Grunbaum*
What subject indeed is so vast as the law of the State? But what is so
trivial as the task of those who give legal advice? . . . Now all this
amounts to little so far as learning is concerned, though for practical
purposes it is indespensable.
Cicero, Laws I. iv. 14
The courts, legal practitioners and the academicians who study them
are influenced by and react to the climate of opinion and events around
them. Sometimes they tend to react rapidly. Other times they tend to
resist change. But they vannot excape the influence of their environment.
Recently, legal practitioners have emphasized such activities as
consumer lawyering and legal aid. Law school academics thus
responded' both to the world around them and to those young law
24. Skogan, Judicial Myth and Judicial Reality at - - infra.
* Professor of Political Science, University of Missouri-St. Louis.
1. See, e.g., The Law Schools and the Minority Group Law Students, A survey for the A.A.L.S.
Committee on Minority Groups, 1970 AALS PROCEEDINGS 9-91.
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students who are no longer satisfied with the prospect of potential
material gain through corporate law practice. These law students
demand that our society improve the quality of life. As a result, for the
first time in many years social scientists have viewed legal practititoners
with envy. Everyone at one time or another has felt the desire "really to
do something!"
However, if all of us immediately sought to do something, the final
result might indeed be less desirable than anticipated because, as
everyone knows, good intentions alone are insufficient to achieve the
better quality of life that we desire and are working toward. When we act
we must do so intelligently.
But while it is easy to agree that our society must promote a better
quality of life, it is difficult to blueprint the kind of knowledge we need to
transform this goal into reality. And once we solve the information
problem--certainly an unlikely prospect-we are faced with a second
problem. Even if we pinpoint the specific social science contributions
necessary to act intelligently, we must identify the appropriate people
who could or should act on the basis of the research. Should we seek
contributions to aid or influence legal practitioners (problem oriented
research), academicians (basic research), analysts, judges, policymakers,
and/or the man on the street? Surely, the contributions that social
science may make to the law are not limited to judges and other
policymakers (problem oriented research).
Unfortunately, the contributions in this symposium are all essentially
addressed to legal policymakers. Accordingly, the immediate need to act
to improve the quality of life has overwhelmed the selection of the
articles placed in this issue. Problem oriented research has been
emphasized over basic theoretical research.
Skogan is concerned with student criticism of courts. Grossman and
Sarat attempt to integrate a vast literature concerned with policy outputs
and the impact of the courts. Schmidhauser, Berg, and Melone are
concerned with congressional criticism of the Supreme Court. Cook
brings attention to the need for increased socialization of federal judges.
Fahey describes the legal problems that result from changing patterns in
public attitude toward the use of marijuana. And Burnham deals with
social science data supporting the discriminatory nature of the Texas
voter registration laws.
I have no quarrel with the quality of this research. In fact, it is rare to
find a single symposium that has the range, breadth, depth, and high
research quality found here. The general level of the present
RESPONSES
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1971/iss2/9
368 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
contributions probably surpasses that of similar symposia published in
the past. But the intense emphasis on problem directed research is novel.
Of course, there is nothing wrong with problem oriented research,
especially of the high calibre found here. My criticism applies to the mix
of the present contributions and to the trends this mix may signal.
Surely, out of six contributions one or two basic theoretical ones would
have been appropriate.
If I felt that the lack of balance found there could be attributed to the
personal idiosyncrasies of those selecting the articles, I might feel easier
about the problem and simply shrug off the matter. But the new
emphasis on problem oriented social science research is a pervasive and
dominant one. It is not only prevalent among legal academics and
government policy makers, but also appears to be gaining ground
among political scientists with their new emphasis on public policy
(impact) research.
The new emphasis on problem oriented social science research is well
stated by law Professor Robert G. Dixon. He laments the small
proportion of public law articles published in political science during the
last decade and then points out that "only about half relate to
substantive issues." By substantive issues he seems to imply problem
oriented social science research. His suggestions for fruitful future
research call for research on negotiation, on influences on the
adjudicatory process, and on impact analysis.
In the same article, Dixon condemns political science's new "ad-
vanced numerology. ' 3 But at the same time he lauds the behavioral
movement as "an important step toward putting some objectivity and
science into political science, and toward asking new questions even
though answers may not be forthcoming." ' 4 Evidently, Professor Dixon
had second thoughts as he roundly criticized political science's efforts
toward establishing at least some theoretical basis for understanding the
legal process through the study of judicial behavior.
Clearly, the emphasis on problem oriented research, especially as
cogently presented by Dixon, deserves serious consideration. However,
two problems then arise. First, to argue against Dixon's position might
suggest the erroneous conclusion that theoretical research is superior to
applied research. And secondly, there really exists no argument
justifying theoretical research on practical grounds. Theoretical research
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may or may not lead to a state of decision. In fact, the chances are
greater that it will not lead to a state of decision.
In order to argue for the validity of a balance between theoretical and
applied research, one must establish the necessity of theoretical
investigations. I would prefer to argue only that research should be
professionally interesting and that the methods be appropriate to carry
out the research design. But Dixon has found judicial behavior research
unintelligible and the mathematical methods inappropriate. Thus, many
scholars fail to accept this argument favoring basic research solely for its
own sake.
The statistical methods Dixon condemns are unfortunately necessary
to conduct basic research in judicial behavior. Statistical methods enable
one to generalize beyond the data actually in hand.5 Quantitative
methods can be used to test traditional insights into the legal process.
"Quantitative techniques have the advantage that general trends can be
projected from vast masses of data, and such general trends should serve
as an additional aid to the appellate lawyer."' It is important to
supplement insights based on educated guesses with replicatile
procedures which can be tested by other investigators.
Dixon would respond that the lawyer can better predict cases than the
political scientist.7 Although no evidence exists supporting Dixon's
claim, even if the claim were true, is it not preferable to have replicatile
procedures that can be used by all? How many Rodells are there in the
legal profession? Moreover, if Professor Rodell's unique methods to
predict appellate court decisions could be standardized in a replicatible
form, all lawyers could share his predictive skills.
Clearly, basic-research is unique because it is abstract and has broad
rather than narrow implications. But more important, it relies on
replication and so leads to objectivity and science.
Accordingly, social science contributions to public law should be
balanced between basic and problem oriented research. Furthermore,
both types of research make an important contribution to law. But more
specifically, how is social science important to the law?
1. Input into legal cases. The Brandeis brief, originally used for the
narrow purpose of supporting legislative intent, is widely recognized as
5. Grossman & Tanenhaus, Toward a Renascence of Public Law, in FRONTIERS OF JUDICIAL
BEHAVIOR 9 (J. Grossman & J. Tanenhaus eds. 1969).
6. Grunbaum & Newhouse, Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Decsions: Some Problems in
Prediction, 3 HOUSTON L. REV. 201 (1965).
7. Dixon, Who is Listening? Political Science Research in Public Law, 4 PS 19, 21 (197 1).
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the "granddaddy" of social science input into the legal process. More
recently, social science inputs into legal cases have become the subject of
academic controversy. The controversy surrounding the social science
evidence used by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education has
been sufficiently publicized to make further comment unnecessary.8
Professor Burnham's brilliant contribution to this symposium is in
the Brandeis tradition. He demonstrates the Texas voter registration
laws to be unconstitutional since they deter voter registration.
2. Explication of normative values underlying legal cases. Professor
Skogan's study of the "judicial myth" is an interesting attempt to
empirically test certain accepted jural postulates. It is a significant
finding that while judges accept the principle that "the rule of law is
superior to the rule of man" such was not the case with the student
sample. Whether such data indicate student hostility toward legal
institutions or whether the data indicate a legally uninformed student
population is difficult to decide.
3. Dynamics of legal decision-making. This area of social science
contributions to the law directs itself less to problem oriented research
than to an understanding of the judicial decision-making process itself.
Especially noteworthy in this area is C. Herman Pritchett's bloc analysis
which pioneered the systematic study of judicial attitudes. Later,
Glendon Schubert refined Pritchett's techniques. The reader is referred
to Professor Barker's introduction of this symposium which traces this
development.
Unfortunately, as noted, there is no contribution in this symposium
dealing with the dynamics of legal decision-making. It is difficult to see
how continued efforts at policy oriented research can be successful unless
they-are based on significant and valid basic theoretical research. Such
basic research would appear to be especially important in understanding
the judicial decision process.
4. Studies of the consequences ofjudicial decisions. Richard Fahey's
article is a detailed and excellent presentation describing changing public
attitudes toward the use of marijuana. Such impact research not only
aids judicial policy makers but also helps administrative and legislative
policy makers.
5. Studies of the political role of the court system. Grossman and
Sarat present an extensive review dealing with much of the literature in
this area. The study and its proposed conceptualization present an
8. See, e.g., Cohn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 150 (1955).
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interesting introduction to the Cook and Schmidhauser studies that also
fall within this general area.
The painstaking and thorough study of the socialization of new
federal judges by Professor Cook presents both important theoretical
conclusions as well as significant practical conclusions. Cook has
thoroughly documented the need for policy makers to consider
alternatives other than additional judgeships to eliminate the legal log
jam found in the federal courts.
The Schmidhauser study presents strong evidence that members of the
Congress who also are lawyers do not assume more favorable attitudes
toward the Supreme Court than non-lawyers, as had been widely
assumed by much of the public media and by many scholars. Such a
conclusion is significant not only to scholars studying the role
perceptions of lawyers but also to policy makers attempting to work
toward a more favorable climate for the courts to function in.
As the studies reported here demonstrate, social science has important
contributions to make to the law in all of these areas. However, applied
research must be supplemented by significant basic theoretical research.
Applied research without substantive theoretical base will lead sooner or
later to the same condemnation of "infant social science" that was
voiced in connection with the Brown v. Board decision. Problem
oriented social science research cannot and will not endure unless it is
grounded in sound basic theoretical research. Although this criticism is
not applicable to the contributions in this symposium, if the present
trend emphasizing policy oriented research continues, it will be only a
matter of time before policy oriented research enters a state of decline.
Therefore, it is regrettable that the present symposium fails to strike a
balance between policy oriented research and basic theoretical studies.
Response -Francis M. Gaffney*
Professor Huntington Cairns, writing in 1935 on the relationship
between law and the social sciences, made the following observation:
No aspect of present legal thinking is more marked than its tendency to
levy upon all fields of knowledge for assistance in the analysis of
fundamental problems . . . . This characteristic results perhaps from the
departure from the view that law was entirely self-sufficient-that a
* Second year law student, Washington University School of Law.
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